Mexican Newspaper 6.new.00100 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

http://rpc.technorati.com/rpc/pingTHE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
303. Mexico Receives No Japanese News

In answer to a circular requesting information as to the reception and dissemination of Domei news reports, Minister Miura replied on September 18, 1941 that no government organization, news agency or newspaper in Mexico was receiving Japanese dispatches. He also reported that the transmission of Domei news items by way of San Francisco had been discontinued since early in September.[842]

304. Minister Miura Foresees Difficulty in Shipping Machinery to Japan

Reporting that since the Presidential order had been issued in Mexico "nerves had become sharpened" regarding export smuggling, the Japanese Minister on September 18, 1941 advised that the transportation of the machinery of the Pacific Petroleum Company to Japan would arouse suspicion and perturb the employees. A shipment of all the machinery at one time would be conspicuous and difficult since the machinery was scattered widely.

Although applications for export permits were being made, it was evident that it would be difficult to obtain them. However, since the machinery would pass customs without inspection as Legation property, there seemed to be no other solution than to have holders of diplomatic passports take a part of the bulky machinery with them as personal luggage whenever they left Mexico.[843]

After investigating the possibilities of obtaining some special machinery which Tokyo had requested, Mr. Miura reported that there would be many difficulties in buying and transporting the equipment, especially, if it became known that it was to be sent to Japan. This stemmed from the reluctance of Mexican businessmen to offend the United States. Furthermore, the Pacific Petroleum Company insisted that it would pay only after the machinery had been put aboard, and refused to take responsibility for putting it on board.[844]

305. Japanese Companies Attempt Barter Despite Mexican Restrictions

Tokyo learned on September 18, 1941 that the Mitsui Company in Mexico, before July 15, 1941, had been attempting to contract for 580 bottles of mercury in anticipation of the possible executive embargo. As a result of working through certain Mexican officials and a fee of 15,000 pesos for Mr. Maximin Camacho, on September 7, 1941 the Mexican Foreign Minister had approved the export of mercury. Another Japanese agent, Mr. Fugio Kata, believed that he would obtain the consent of General Maximin Camacho, a brother of the Mexican President, to barter 20,000 boxes of artificial silk for 10,000 bottles of mercury. Since Foreign Minister Padilla had given no indication that he would approve this transaction and General Camacho could be reached only through intermediaries, the Japanese officials in Mexico suggested that they be permitted to move slowly, especially in view of Mexican reluctance to offend the United States.[845]

The Mitsui representative had been instructed to work with the Legation in securing mercury, but since he was acting without consulting Legation officials, Minister Miura asked that the Mitsui Office be ordered to instruct its representative that such negotiations were a matter of national policy and were not to be handled by Mitsui as a company or as individuals. He asked that Japanese naval officials also be advised to this effect.[846]

306. Japan Transports American Money for the German Legation

On September 18, 1941 the Heiyo Maru left Manzanillo with three trunks filled with Japanese diplomatic documents. One contained $100,000 in American currency belonging to the

[842] III, 590.
[843] III, 591.
[844] III, 592.
[845] III, 593, 594.
[846] III, 595.

[179]

German Legation. Minister Miura advised Tokyo on September 20, 1941 that the trunks had been securely sealed and entrusted to the Captain of the ship.[847]

307. Minister Miura Requests Increased Expense Allowances

In an attempt to persuade the Japanese Foreign Office to increase the expense allowances of its Legation staff in Mexico, the Japanese Minister pointed out on September 23, 1941 that the standard of living in Mexico had risen sharply. Contributing factors to an advance in Mexican prices were a previous rise in the United States and the scarcity of materials caused by the American armament program. According to the Japanese Minister, Mexico had become more dependent on American economy since the Mexican-American treaty of July. The advance in prices, amounting to 40 or 50 per cent, had made it difficult for the Legation staff to keep up appearances and maintain its prestige. It was necessary, therefore, that the staff's allowance be increased until it reached the level of other Japanese diplomatic establishments.[848]

308. Japanese Foreign Minister Attempts to Expedite Barter Negotiations

Since the Azuma Maru in Tokyo was about to sail, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked on September 24, 1941 that the Japanese Minister in Mexico request the Mexican Foreign Office to instruct the Mexican Minister in Tokyo as to its wishes in this respect. Minister Miura also was asked for any suggestions he might have.[849]

In accordance with this request, Minister Miura paid a visit to the Under Secretary of the Mexican Foreign Office on September 21, 1941 to inform him that the Mexican Minister in Tokyo had made representations to the Japanese government regarding the bartering of fuel oil for silk. Japan had approved the plan, and in return had submitted a concrete proposal, which had not yet been answered. The Mexican Minister replied that no decision concerning general principles could be reached until a technical study of the amount, price, and method of payment had been completed.[850]

Minister Miura then stated that a misunderstanding must exist, since Japan had already accepted Mexico's proposal. Furthermore, a boat, already loaded with silk, would arrive at Manzanillo during the first part of October, and Japan desired a settlement of the commercial agreement before the ship reached port. The Under Secretary agreed to accelerate the study of problems concerned, but said that the Foreign Office did not have time to arrange the matter on such short notice.[851]

309. Tokyo Accepts Mexican Inspection of Parcel Post

Although Minister Miura had been informed that the policy of opening diplomatic parcel post in the presence of Mexican customs officials would be objectionable to the Japanese government, the Japanese Minister had by September 25, 1941 made no representations concerning his government's reaction. He explained that other diplomatic establishments had considered it as a simple routine matter and reported it to their governments.

Since neither the German nor Italian staffs in Mexico had protested, Minister Miura felt that it would be unwise for Japan alone to protest, especially since the measure applied only to packages addressed to diplomats as individuals and not to those sent to their offices. Other nations had taken this same emergency step. For this reason Minister Miura had replied to the Mexican government only that he had reported the measure to his Foreign Office.[852] Two days later, Tokyo notified him that it had no objections to his action.[853]

[847] III, 596.
[848] III, 597.
[849] III, 598.
[850] III, 599.
[851] Ibid.
[852] III, 600.
[853] III, 601.

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

310. Japan Considers Evacuating Its Nationals in Mexico

In reply to a request from Tokyo it was announced on September 27, 1941 that no Japanese were awaiting evacuation in Mexico. However, seven persons connected with the Pacific Petroleum Company would have to return to Japan in the near future. If the situation grew worse, the staff, its employees and families, totaling fifty-three, as well as employees of the commercial companies of Assenjo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and 20 other persons would have to be evacuated.[854]

311. Mitsui Company Considers Kato Barter Scheme

Since the Kato firm had devised a scheme to trade 10,000 flasks of mercury for 20,000 cases of rayon thread, with 10 per cent of the rayon price to be paid to high ranking Mexican government officials, the Mitsui Company, on September 29, 1941, asked its representative to promote competition among other Japanese firms since the price appeared to be exorbitant. Furthermore, it appeared to be impossible to secure 10,000 flasks of mercury in Mexico. Since Japanese officials had urged that the firms cooperate in this venture which was to be handled in the name of one firm, the Kato and Mitsui firms would soon confer. The Mitsui agent was advised to spare no effort in improving the situation.[855]

312. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Further Information on Kato Proposal

On the same day, September 29, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked Minister Miura's opinion regarding the Mitsui-Kato proposal. Though Japan desired to complete a trade agreement before the Azuma Maru's arrival at Manzanillo, the Mexican government's telegram to its Minister in Tokyo, received on September 27, 1941, had given no hope for a speedy settlement.[856]

313. Japanese Military Officials Plan in Mexico to Leave for Japan

On September 29, 1941 the Military Service Bureau, Air Service Headquarters and the Army Technical Headquarters in Japan were informed by the Japanese Military Attache in Washington that Lt. Colonel Nakano and Major Omori would leave Manzanillo, Mexico on October 7, 1941 aboard the Azuma Maru. By following a direct route from the southwest coast of the United States, the Azuma Maru would probably arrive in Japan about November 21, 1941. Another Japanese Army officer, Colonel Oka, was in San Francisco awaiting to depart aboard a Japanese tanker.[857]

314. General Camacho is Appointed to Cabinet

The appointment on September 29, 1941 of General Maximino Avila Camacho, brother of the Mexican President, to the post of Minister of Communications was reported to Tokyo on September 30, 1941. This action could be considered as a step toward solidifying the government, Minister Miura said. The appointment was probably of great importance in view of the appearance of an anti-Cabinet feeling on the part of labor.[858]

315. Minister Miura Suggests Selling Japanese Silk in Mexico

Replying on September 30, 1941 to the Foreign Minister's dispatch informing him that the Azuma Maru would sail for Mexico and the disposal of its shipment of silk would be left to his

[854] III, 602-603.
[855] III, 604.
[856] III, 605.
[857] III, 606. This message was not translated until March 10, 1945.
[858] III, 607.

[181]

judgment, Minister Miura declared that no explanation had ever been given him as to the reason for shipping the silk. Since the negotiations being conducted by the Kato and Mitsui firms had aroused Mexico's hope of procuring rayon, and since Mexico knew that Japan realized how desperate was its need, the sending of the unloaded ship back to Japan would have a disastrous effect upon Japanese-Mexican relations.[859] The Japanese Minister suggested, therefore, that the rayon be distributed in equitable amounts to various Mexican concerns in order to improve relations between the two countries. He asked the Japanese Foreign Office to instruct the Captain of the Azuma Maru to unload at Manzanillo.[860]

Since Minister Miura felt that this was a blunder which had occurred as the result of some scheme of the Japanese Navy he stated that if the Foreign Office, knowing the trade situation with Mexico, had issued orders at the instigation of the Japanese Navy, it had acted unwisely. If the orders had been issued in ignorance, he felt that those entrusted with Mexican trade matters had better examine themselves.[861]

Advising Tokyo that the Mexican Minister would soon call at the Japanese Foreign Office,[862] Minister Miura said that he had called on the Mexican Vice Foreign Minister on October 1, 1941. He had been informed that there was little prospect of any agreement being reached concerning the proposed barter of silk for oil. However, since the rayon had already been shipped, Mexico proposed to purchase it for cash. Minister Miura replied that though the rayon should be shipped back, and he had had nothing to do with the shipment nor the barter discussions, he would dislike seeing the rayon returned.[863]Consequently, despite the profits which could be made from selling at the current market price, he suggested that the rayon be sold at the price stipulated in the contract made before the Presidential embargo was imposed.[864]

316. The Pacific Petroleum Company Ceases Operations

On October 2, 1941 Tokyo was informed by the Japanese Minister that the Pacific Petroleum Company in Mexico had ceased operations as of September 30, 1941.[865]

317. Minister Miura Reports on American-Mexican Negotiations (October 2, 1941)

The Japanese Minister reported on October 2, 1941 that Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla had revealed in a newspaper interview that Mexico was negotiating with the United States' State Department though Mexico's Ambassador to Washington, and that the Minister of Finance, Mr. Eduardo Suarez, had departed for Washington to discuss pending problems between America and Mexico. The Mexican Foreign Minister had declared that he would inform his people in the near future of the united friendship that existed between the two countries of America and Mexico. According to an American dispatch, the United States had approved a loan of eight to thirty million American dollars to stabilize Mexican money.[866]

318. Japan Releases Silk Shipment for Sale

Forewarned by Minister Miura of the nature of the Mexican Minister's instructions in regard to Mexico's rejection of the barter proposal, the Japanese Foreign Office replied to the Mexican Minister on October 2, 1941 that it would delay in answering formally until the opinion of several officials had been received.[867]

[859] III, 608.
[860] Ibid.
[861] Ibid.
[862] III, 609.
[863] III, 609-610.
[864] III, 610.
[865] III, 611.
[866] III, 612.
[867] III, 613.

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

On October 3, 1941 the Mexican Minister, Mr. Amezcua, had been informed by Foreign Minister Toyoda that in view of Japanese-Mexican relations, the shipment of silk would be released for sale in Mexico. He was asked to notify the Mexican Foreign Office, since it was necessary that fuel oil be made available to the Azuma Maru. Minister Miura was instructed to press the oil matter because negotiations with Argentina and Peru might be delayed.[868]

319. Japanese Agents Propose to Smuggle Oil for Germany

By October 4, 1941 Japanese Military Attache Commander Kyoho Hamanakia had arranged, at the request of the German Naval Attache in Tokyo, to load petroleum products as bunker oil on Japanese ships which touched Manzanillo. After arriving in Japan, the unused portion of petroleum would be turned over to the German Naval Attache in Tokyo for disposal. Officials of Japanese companies were exerting efforts to obtain fuel oil so that the secret plan would not fail.[869]

320. Mexico Discovers Smuggled Mercury at Manzanillo

On October 6, 1941 Minister Miura reported to Tokyo that Mexican custom officials at Manzanillo had discovered smuggled exports of mercury and other materials which were to be shipped on the Azuma Maru. Minister Miura had learned of this when a special Associated Press correspondent had telephoned the Minister for his opinion in the matter.[870]

Articles in Mexican newspapers, the Excelsior, the Universal and Nobedades, were transmitted to Tokyo on the same day. The Excelsior declared that the discovery of a large amount of mercury and lead which was to be smuggled out in the Azuma Maru made it apparent that customs officials had been deceived and international agreements had been violated. According to officials making an investigation at Manzanillo, the mercury contained in bottles weighing 76 pounds each had been camouflaged in all sorts of commercial shipments. The Nobedades reported that certain elements were continuously working to establish Manzanillo as a supply base for the Axis countries.[871]

321. Japanese Navy Attache Leads Attempts to Acquire Fuel Oil

Tokyo had learned that difficulty was being encountered in getting fuel oil for the Terukawa Maru. On October 8, 1941 a company representative in Mexico was directed to keep in close touch with the Japanese Naval Attache in such matters.[872]

322. Pacific Petroleum Company Ships Machinery on Azuma Maru

The precision machinery of the Pacific Petroleum Company had been transported to Japan on the Terukawa Maru, which left Acapulco on October 6, 1941. The head of the company, Mr. Kubota, was asked to arrange with the Foreign Office and Naval Ministry to unload the shipment after its arrival in Yokohama, and to have the machinery insured for a value of $17,300.[873]

323. Mexican Foreign Office Denies Japanese Request for Oil

Keeping Tokyo informed of subsequent developments in regard to the Azuma Maru and having called on the Foreign Office Under Secretary on October 7, 1941, Minister Miura re-

[868] Ibid.
[869] III, 614.
[870] III, 615.
[871] III, 616.
[872] III, 617.
[873] III, 618.

[183]

ported that the Under Secretary had reiterated his thanks for Japan's decision to sell the shipment of artificial silk in view of the general trend of Japanese-Mexican relations. Although the Under Secretary was in favor of supplying fuel oil to ships sailing from Manzanillo to Yokohama, he refused fuel for either one-way or round trips to Valparaiso on the grounds that such an understanding was precluded by certain agreements. Voicing his opinion with reluctance when questioned by Minister Miura as to how the Mexican government could supply fuel oil, he answered that the Mexican Petroleum Bureau should be questioned in that respect.[874]

324. Minister Miura Blames Minister Amezcua for Barter Failure

Investigating the reason for the failure of the barter negotiations, Minister Miura discovered through the Under Secretary of the Mexican Foreign Office that the Mexican Minister to Tokyo, Mr. Amezcua, had given his home government no reports concerning the attitude of Japan.

Since it was his opinion that a grave mistake had been made by Minister Amezcua in regard to details of the barter, Minister Miura advised that the Japanese Foreign Office use the utmost discretion in future dealings with him.[875]

325. Minister Miura Suggests Using Illegal Methods

On October 8, 1941 Minister Miura suggested that Japan should not follow open diplomatic means in obtaining Mexican petroleum, but should effect a settlement of this practical problem by other methods. He had received the impression that even though the United States had or had not instituted a practical embargo of petroleum products to Japan, Mexico would not dare to contract or pledge supplies to Japan.

Pointing out that there had been no lack of oil for Japanese ships when the purchases had been made by the ships themselves, Minister Miura said that he and the Japanese Naval Attache agreed that it would be well not to be too fastidious about the matter of procuring petroleum, and it should be left in the hands of Japanese Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire representatives.[876]

326. Two Japanese Army Officers Sail Aboard the Azuma Maru

On October 9, 1941 the Japanese Ministry in Mexico City notified the Embassy in Washington that Lt. Colonel Nakano and Major Omori had sailed aboard the Azuma Maru as scheduled. On the same day, October 7, 1941, Messrs. Waki, Uchida, Yoshioka, Kaneko and Morimura had arrived in Mexico City to await further orders.[877]

327. Mexican Newspapers Suggest Recall of Japanese Representatives

Reporting again on October 14, 1941 concerning the unfortunate discovery of mercury and lead smuggled aboard the Azuma Maru, the Japanese Minister summarized recent editorials which had appeared in various Mexican newspapers. Each paper had published vindictive articles saying that the true character of the Military and Naval Attaches of a certain Eastern country had finally become apparent. On October 12, and 14, 1941 the Excelsior had suggested that the Foreign Office should request the withdrawal of foreign diplomats if they were responsible for this incident.[878]

[874] III, 619.
[875] III, 620.
[876] III, 621.
[877] III, 622-623.
[878] III, 624.