http://rpc.technorati.com/rpc/ping
In the spring of 1862, during the Peninsula Campaign, the Union Army of the Potomac under General George B. McClellan advanced upon Richmond from Fort Monroe, eventually reaching the eastern edges of the Confederate capital along the Chickahominy River. Following the wounding of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston at the Battle of Seven Pines, on June 1, 1862, Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia, his first opportunity to lead an army in the field. Newspaper editorials of the day objected to his appointment due to concerns that Lee would not be aggressive and would wait for the Union army to come to him. Early in the war his men called him "Granny Lee" because of his allegedly timid style of command.[29] After the Seven Days Battles until the end of the war his men called him simply "Marse Robert." He oversaw substantial strengthening of Richmond's defenses during the first three weeks of June and then launched a series of attacks, the Seven Days Battles, against McClellan's forces. Lee's attacks resulted in heavy Confederate casualties and they were marred by clumsy tactical performances by his subordinates, but his aggressive actions unnerved McClellan, who retreated to a point on the James River where Union naval forces were in control. These successes led to a rapid turn-around of public opinion and the newspaper editorials quickly changed their tune on Lee's aggressiveness.
After McClellan's retreat, Lee defeated another Union army at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Within 90 days of taking command, Lee had run McClellan off the Peninsula, defeated Pope at Second Manassas, and the battle lines had moved from 6 miles outside Richmond, to 20 miles outside Washington. Instead of a quick end to the war that the Peninsula Campaign had promised in its early stages, the war would go on for almost another 3 years and claim a half million more lives. He then invaded Maryland, hoping to replenish his supplies and possibly influence the Northern elections to fall in favor of ending the war. McClellan's men recovered a lost order that revealed Lee's plans. McClellan always exaggerated Lee's forces, but now he knew the Confederate army was divided and could be destroyed by an all-out attack at Antietam. Yet McClellan was too slow in moving, not realizing Lee had been informed by a spy that McClellan had the plans. Lee urgently recalled Stonewall Jackson and in the bloodiest day of the war, Lee withstood the Union assaults. He withdrew his battered army back to Virginia while President Abraham Lincoln used the reverse as sufficient pretext to announce the Emancipation Proclamation to put the Confederacy on the diplomatic and moral defensive.
September 1866 Lee mounted on Traveller
Disappointed by McClellan's failure to destroy Lee's army, Lincoln named Ambrose Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Burnside ordered an attack across the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg. Delays in getting bridges built across the river allowed Lee's army ample time to organize strong defenses, and the attack on December 12, 1862, was a disaster for the Union. Lincoln then named Joseph Hooker commander of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker's advance to attack Lee in May, 1863, near Chancellorsville, Virginia, was defeated by Lee and Stonewall Jackson's daring plan to divide the army and attack Hooker's flank. It was a victory over a larger force, but it also came with a great cost; Jackson, one of Lee's best subordinates, was accidentally wounded by his own troops, and soon after died of pneumonia.
Saturday, January 9, 2010
Monday, November 16, 2009
practice 6.pra.992 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
http://rpc.technorati.com/rpc/ping
You t'ink-a you smart
you foolish-a boy
Tomorrow you start
In my-a employ!
You unner-a-stan'?
You like-a my plan —?"
Pirelli the Barber in "Sweeney Todd" by Stephen Sondheim.
History would have been much different if the parson had found a different tradesman in need of an apprentice in the weeks following the disappearance of Sweeney Todd's parents. Somehow, the Bloody Blacksmith of Bowler Street doesn't have the same ring to it as the Demon Barber. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire But shortly after he became a ward of the court, Sweeney was turned over to a cutler, the trade responsible for, among other things, manufacturing and sharpening knives and razors.
Under the sign of the "Pistol and C" in Great Turnstile, Holborn, the aptly named John Crook had set up shop, fashioning any number of articles from backgammon tables to gunpowder, but specializing in razors. Apprentices in the 18th century were little more than slaves to their masters, and foul treatment at the hands of the teacher was the norm. The students lived in disheartening poverty, and those orphans who had no one to stand up for them, were most cruelly used.
"Any person, master or journeyman, man or woman, housekeeper or lodger, who would undertake to provide food, lodging and instruction, could take an apprentice," wrote Dorothy George. "All the earnings of the apprentice, whether they were for the master or a third person, became the property of the master."
A report issued by the government around the time of Todd's apprenticeship to Crook, reveals a common practice: "The master may be a tiger in cruelty... (and) few people take much notice. The greatest part of those who now take poor apprentices are the most indigent and dishonest, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire and it is the fate of many a poor child, not only to be half-starved and sometimes bred up in no trade, but to be forced to thieve and steal for his master, and so is brought to the gallows into the bargain."
Young Sweeney Todd almost fell into that common trap, when two years after he joined Crook's shop he was arrested and convicted of petty larceny. The details of the crime are scarce, whether Crook was the victim or co-conspirator was never recorded. Sweeney could have walked the steps to the hangman's noose for a theft conviction, but since he was just 14 years old, the judge at Old Bailey took pity on the orphan and sentenced him to five years in Newgate Prison. The mercy shown to Sweeney Todd was, as noted above, unusual. Children trained as pickpockets were hanged for as little as the theft of a handkerchief, and any kind of shoplifting was punishable by death.
You t'ink-a you smart
you foolish-a boy
Tomorrow you start
In my-a employ!
You unner-a-stan'?
You like-a my plan —?"
Pirelli the Barber in "Sweeney Todd" by Stephen Sondheim.
History would have been much different if the parson had found a different tradesman in need of an apprentice in the weeks following the disappearance of Sweeney Todd's parents. Somehow, the Bloody Blacksmith of Bowler Street doesn't have the same ring to it as the Demon Barber. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire But shortly after he became a ward of the court, Sweeney was turned over to a cutler, the trade responsible for, among other things, manufacturing and sharpening knives and razors.
Under the sign of the "Pistol and C" in Great Turnstile, Holborn, the aptly named John Crook had set up shop, fashioning any number of articles from backgammon tables to gunpowder, but specializing in razors. Apprentices in the 18th century were little more than slaves to their masters, and foul treatment at the hands of the teacher was the norm. The students lived in disheartening poverty, and those orphans who had no one to stand up for them, were most cruelly used.
"Any person, master or journeyman, man or woman, housekeeper or lodger, who would undertake to provide food, lodging and instruction, could take an apprentice," wrote Dorothy George. "All the earnings of the apprentice, whether they were for the master or a third person, became the property of the master."
A report issued by the government around the time of Todd's apprenticeship to Crook, reveals a common practice: "The master may be a tiger in cruelty... (and) few people take much notice. The greatest part of those who now take poor apprentices are the most indigent and dishonest, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire and it is the fate of many a poor child, not only to be half-starved and sometimes bred up in no trade, but to be forced to thieve and steal for his master, and so is brought to the gallows into the bargain."
Young Sweeney Todd almost fell into that common trap, when two years after he joined Crook's shop he was arrested and convicted of petty larceny. The details of the crime are scarce, whether Crook was the victim or co-conspirator was never recorded. Sweeney could have walked the steps to the hangman's noose for a theft conviction, but since he was just 14 years old, the judge at Old Bailey took pity on the orphan and sentenced him to five years in Newgate Prison. The mercy shown to Sweeney Todd was, as noted above, unusual. Children trained as pickpockets were hanged for as little as the theft of a handkerchief, and any kind of shoplifting was punishable by death.
Thursday, September 24, 2009
also 5.als.0004004 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
http://rpc.technorati.com/rpc/ping
Department of the Air Force, Current and past records management regulations
Washington, D.C. Report of Air Force Research Regarding the Roswell Incident, July 1994
Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. Current and past records management regulations
Dept of the Navy, Washington, D.C. Air accident reports, July 1947
Air Force Safety Agency, Kirtland Air Air accident reports, July 1947
Force Base, N. Mex.
Air Force History Support Office, 509th Bomb Group and RAAF monthly
Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, histories, July and August 1947
D.C.
National Security Agency, FOIA records, Citizens Against UFO Secrecy
Fort Meade, Md.
Military History Institute, Army War Army Counterintelligence Corps reports,1947
College, Carlisle, Pa.
Army Central Security Facility, Army Counterintelligence Corps reports, 1947
Fort Meade, Md.
Central Intelligence Agency, Scientific Advisory Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects (Robertson
Langley,Va. Panel) report FOIA records, Ground Saucer Watch, Inc.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, FOIA records on unidentified flying objects
Washington, D.C.
National Atomic Museum, Kirtland Air 509th Bomb Group historical information, 1947
Force Base, N. Mex. RAAF base newspaper Atomic Blast, July
and August 1947
\a Project Sign was the predecessor to Project Blue Book.
Our search of government records was complicated by the fact that some records we wanted to review were missing and there was not always an explanation. Further, the records management regulations for the retention and disposition of records were unclear or changing during the period we reviewed.
We also queried the National Security Council, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Department of Energy, the FBI, DOD, and the CIA to determine what government records they have on the Roswell crash. We did not independently verify the information provided to us in their written responses.
In addition to physically examining government records, we contacted the following federal activities to determine whether they had any information about the Roswell crash:
# Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama;
# Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;
Department of the Air Force, Current and past records management regulations
Washington, D.C. Report of Air Force Research Regarding the Roswell Incident, July 1994
Dept of the Army, Washington, D.C. Current and past records management regulations
Dept of the Navy, Washington, D.C. Air accident reports, July 1947
Air Force Safety Agency, Kirtland Air Air accident reports, July 1947
Force Base, N. Mex.
Air Force History Support Office, 509th Bomb Group and RAAF monthly
Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, histories, July and August 1947
D.C.
National Security Agency, FOIA records, Citizens Against UFO Secrecy
Fort Meade, Md.
Military History Institute, Army War Army Counterintelligence Corps reports,1947
College, Carlisle, Pa.
Army Central Security Facility, Army Counterintelligence Corps reports, 1947
Fort Meade, Md.
Central Intelligence Agency, Scientific Advisory Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects (Robertson
Langley,Va. Panel) report FOIA records, Ground Saucer Watch, Inc.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, FOIA records on unidentified flying objects
Washington, D.C.
National Atomic Museum, Kirtland Air 509th Bomb Group historical information, 1947
Force Base, N. Mex. RAAF base newspaper Atomic Blast, July
and August 1947
\a Project Sign was the predecessor to Project Blue Book.
Our search of government records was complicated by the fact that some records we wanted to review were missing and there was not always an explanation. Further, the records management regulations for the retention and disposition of records were unclear or changing during the period we reviewed.
We also queried the National Security Council, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Department of Energy, the FBI, DOD, and the CIA to determine what government records they have on the Roswell crash. We did not independently verify the information provided to us in their written responses.
In addition to physically examining government records, we contacted the following federal activities to determine whether they had any information about the Roswell crash:
# Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama;
# Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;
Sunday, August 2, 2009
Mexican Newspaper 6.new.00100 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
http://rpc.technorati.com/rpc/pingTHE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
303. Mexico Receives No Japanese News
In answer to a circular requesting information as to the reception and dissemination of Domei news reports, Minister Miura replied on September 18, 1941 that no government organization, news agency or newspaper in Mexico was receiving Japanese dispatches. He also reported that the transmission of Domei news items by way of San Francisco had been discontinued since early in September.[842]
304. Minister Miura Foresees Difficulty in Shipping Machinery to Japan
Reporting that since the Presidential order had been issued in Mexico "nerves had become sharpened" regarding export smuggling, the Japanese Minister on September 18, 1941 advised that the transportation of the machinery of the Pacific Petroleum Company to Japan would arouse suspicion and perturb the employees. A shipment of all the machinery at one time would be conspicuous and difficult since the machinery was scattered widely.
Although applications for export permits were being made, it was evident that it would be difficult to obtain them. However, since the machinery would pass customs without inspection as Legation property, there seemed to be no other solution than to have holders of diplomatic passports take a part of the bulky machinery with them as personal luggage whenever they left Mexico.[843]
After investigating the possibilities of obtaining some special machinery which Tokyo had requested, Mr. Miura reported that there would be many difficulties in buying and transporting the equipment, especially, if it became known that it was to be sent to Japan. This stemmed from the reluctance of Mexican businessmen to offend the United States. Furthermore, the Pacific Petroleum Company insisted that it would pay only after the machinery had been put aboard, and refused to take responsibility for putting it on board.[844]
305. Japanese Companies Attempt Barter Despite Mexican Restrictions
Tokyo learned on September 18, 1941 that the Mitsui Company in Mexico, before July 15, 1941, had been attempting to contract for 580 bottles of mercury in anticipation of the possible executive embargo. As a result of working through certain Mexican officials and a fee of 15,000 pesos for Mr. Maximin Camacho, on September 7, 1941 the Mexican Foreign Minister had approved the export of mercury. Another Japanese agent, Mr. Fugio Kata, believed that he would obtain the consent of General Maximin Camacho, a brother of the Mexican President, to barter 20,000 boxes of artificial silk for 10,000 bottles of mercury. Since Foreign Minister Padilla had given no indication that he would approve this transaction and General Camacho could be reached only through intermediaries, the Japanese officials in Mexico suggested that they be permitted to move slowly, especially in view of Mexican reluctance to offend the United States.[845]
The Mitsui representative had been instructed to work with the Legation in securing mercury, but since he was acting without consulting Legation officials, Minister Miura asked that the Mitsui Office be ordered to instruct its representative that such negotiations were a matter of national policy and were not to be handled by Mitsui as a company or as individuals. He asked that Japanese naval officials also be advised to this effect.[846]
306. Japan Transports American Money for the German Legation
On September 18, 1941 the Heiyo Maru left Manzanillo with three trunks filled with Japanese diplomatic documents. One contained $100,000 in American currency belonging to the
[842] III, 590.
[843] III, 591.
[844] III, 592.
[845] III, 593, 594.
[846] III, 595.
[179]
German Legation. Minister Miura advised Tokyo on September 20, 1941 that the trunks had been securely sealed and entrusted to the Captain of the ship.[847]
307. Minister Miura Requests Increased Expense Allowances
In an attempt to persuade the Japanese Foreign Office to increase the expense allowances of its Legation staff in Mexico, the Japanese Minister pointed out on September 23, 1941 that the standard of living in Mexico had risen sharply. Contributing factors to an advance in Mexican prices were a previous rise in the United States and the scarcity of materials caused by the American armament program. According to the Japanese Minister, Mexico had become more dependent on American economy since the Mexican-American treaty of July. The advance in prices, amounting to 40 or 50 per cent, had made it difficult for the Legation staff to keep up appearances and maintain its prestige. It was necessary, therefore, that the staff's allowance be increased until it reached the level of other Japanese diplomatic establishments.[848]
308. Japanese Foreign Minister Attempts to Expedite Barter Negotiations
Since the Azuma Maru in Tokyo was about to sail, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked on September 24, 1941 that the Japanese Minister in Mexico request the Mexican Foreign Office to instruct the Mexican Minister in Tokyo as to its wishes in this respect. Minister Miura also was asked for any suggestions he might have.[849]
In accordance with this request, Minister Miura paid a visit to the Under Secretary of the Mexican Foreign Office on September 21, 1941 to inform him that the Mexican Minister in Tokyo had made representations to the Japanese government regarding the bartering of fuel oil for silk. Japan had approved the plan, and in return had submitted a concrete proposal, which had not yet been answered. The Mexican Minister replied that no decision concerning general principles could be reached until a technical study of the amount, price, and method of payment had been completed.[850]
Minister Miura then stated that a misunderstanding must exist, since Japan had already accepted Mexico's proposal. Furthermore, a boat, already loaded with silk, would arrive at Manzanillo during the first part of October, and Japan desired a settlement of the commercial agreement before the ship reached port. The Under Secretary agreed to accelerate the study of problems concerned, but said that the Foreign Office did not have time to arrange the matter on such short notice.[851]
309. Tokyo Accepts Mexican Inspection of Parcel Post
Although Minister Miura had been informed that the policy of opening diplomatic parcel post in the presence of Mexican customs officials would be objectionable to the Japanese government, the Japanese Minister had by September 25, 1941 made no representations concerning his government's reaction. He explained that other diplomatic establishments had considered it as a simple routine matter and reported it to their governments.
Since neither the German nor Italian staffs in Mexico had protested, Minister Miura felt that it would be unwise for Japan alone to protest, especially since the measure applied only to packages addressed to diplomats as individuals and not to those sent to their offices. Other nations had taken this same emergency step. For this reason Minister Miura had replied to the Mexican government only that he had reported the measure to his Foreign Office.[852] Two days later, Tokyo notified him that it had no objections to his action.[853]
[847] III, 596.
[848] III, 597.
[849] III, 598.
[850] III, 599.
[851] Ibid.
[852] III, 600.
[853] III, 601.
180
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
310. Japan Considers Evacuating Its Nationals in Mexico
In reply to a request from Tokyo it was announced on September 27, 1941 that no Japanese were awaiting evacuation in Mexico. However, seven persons connected with the Pacific Petroleum Company would have to return to Japan in the near future. If the situation grew worse, the staff, its employees and families, totaling fifty-three, as well as employees of the commercial companies of Assenjo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and 20 other persons would have to be evacuated.[854]
311. Mitsui Company Considers Kato Barter Scheme
Since the Kato firm had devised a scheme to trade 10,000 flasks of mercury for 20,000 cases of rayon thread, with 10 per cent of the rayon price to be paid to high ranking Mexican government officials, the Mitsui Company, on September 29, 1941, asked its representative to promote competition among other Japanese firms since the price appeared to be exorbitant. Furthermore, it appeared to be impossible to secure 10,000 flasks of mercury in Mexico. Since Japanese officials had urged that the firms cooperate in this venture which was to be handled in the name of one firm, the Kato and Mitsui firms would soon confer. The Mitsui agent was advised to spare no effort in improving the situation.[855]
312. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Further Information on Kato Proposal
On the same day, September 29, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked Minister Miura's opinion regarding the Mitsui-Kato proposal. Though Japan desired to complete a trade agreement before the Azuma Maru's arrival at Manzanillo, the Mexican government's telegram to its Minister in Tokyo, received on September 27, 1941, had given no hope for a speedy settlement.[856]
313. Japanese Military Officials Plan in Mexico to Leave for Japan
On September 29, 1941 the Military Service Bureau, Air Service Headquarters and the Army Technical Headquarters in Japan were informed by the Japanese Military Attache in Washington that Lt. Colonel Nakano and Major Omori would leave Manzanillo, Mexico on October 7, 1941 aboard the Azuma Maru. By following a direct route from the southwest coast of the United States, the Azuma Maru would probably arrive in Japan about November 21, 1941. Another Japanese Army officer, Colonel Oka, was in San Francisco awaiting to depart aboard a Japanese tanker.[857]
314. General Camacho is Appointed to Cabinet
The appointment on September 29, 1941 of General Maximino Avila Camacho, brother of the Mexican President, to the post of Minister of Communications was reported to Tokyo on September 30, 1941. This action could be considered as a step toward solidifying the government, Minister Miura said. The appointment was probably of great importance in view of the appearance of an anti-Cabinet feeling on the part of labor.[858]
315. Minister Miura Suggests Selling Japanese Silk in Mexico
Replying on September 30, 1941 to the Foreign Minister's dispatch informing him that the Azuma Maru would sail for Mexico and the disposal of its shipment of silk would be left to his
[854] III, 602-603.
[855] III, 604.
[856] III, 605.
[857] III, 606. This message was not translated until March 10, 1945.
[858] III, 607.
[181]
judgment, Minister Miura declared that no explanation had ever been given him as to the reason for shipping the silk. Since the negotiations being conducted by the Kato and Mitsui firms had aroused Mexico's hope of procuring rayon, and since Mexico knew that Japan realized how desperate was its need, the sending of the unloaded ship back to Japan would have a disastrous effect upon Japanese-Mexican relations.[859] The Japanese Minister suggested, therefore, that the rayon be distributed in equitable amounts to various Mexican concerns in order to improve relations between the two countries. He asked the Japanese Foreign Office to instruct the Captain of the Azuma Maru to unload at Manzanillo.[860]
Since Minister Miura felt that this was a blunder which had occurred as the result of some scheme of the Japanese Navy he stated that if the Foreign Office, knowing the trade situation with Mexico, had issued orders at the instigation of the Japanese Navy, it had acted unwisely. If the orders had been issued in ignorance, he felt that those entrusted with Mexican trade matters had better examine themselves.[861]
Advising Tokyo that the Mexican Minister would soon call at the Japanese Foreign Office,[862] Minister Miura said that he had called on the Mexican Vice Foreign Minister on October 1, 1941. He had been informed that there was little prospect of any agreement being reached concerning the proposed barter of silk for oil. However, since the rayon had already been shipped, Mexico proposed to purchase it for cash. Minister Miura replied that though the rayon should be shipped back, and he had had nothing to do with the shipment nor the barter discussions, he would dislike seeing the rayon returned.[863]Consequently, despite the profits which could be made from selling at the current market price, he suggested that the rayon be sold at the price stipulated in the contract made before the Presidential embargo was imposed.[864]
316. The Pacific Petroleum Company Ceases Operations
On October 2, 1941 Tokyo was informed by the Japanese Minister that the Pacific Petroleum Company in Mexico had ceased operations as of September 30, 1941.[865]
317. Minister Miura Reports on American-Mexican Negotiations (October 2, 1941)
The Japanese Minister reported on October 2, 1941 that Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla had revealed in a newspaper interview that Mexico was negotiating with the United States' State Department though Mexico's Ambassador to Washington, and that the Minister of Finance, Mr. Eduardo Suarez, had departed for Washington to discuss pending problems between America and Mexico. The Mexican Foreign Minister had declared that he would inform his people in the near future of the united friendship that existed between the two countries of America and Mexico. According to an American dispatch, the United States had approved a loan of eight to thirty million American dollars to stabilize Mexican money.[866]
318. Japan Releases Silk Shipment for Sale
Forewarned by Minister Miura of the nature of the Mexican Minister's instructions in regard to Mexico's rejection of the barter proposal, the Japanese Foreign Office replied to the Mexican Minister on October 2, 1941 that it would delay in answering formally until the opinion of several officials had been received.[867]
[859] III, 608.
[860] Ibid.
[861] Ibid.
[862] III, 609.
[863] III, 609-610.
[864] III, 610.
[865] III, 611.
[866] III, 612.
[867] III, 613.
[182]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
On October 3, 1941 the Mexican Minister, Mr. Amezcua, had been informed by Foreign Minister Toyoda that in view of Japanese-Mexican relations, the shipment of silk would be released for sale in Mexico. He was asked to notify the Mexican Foreign Office, since it was necessary that fuel oil be made available to the Azuma Maru. Minister Miura was instructed to press the oil matter because negotiations with Argentina and Peru might be delayed.[868]
319. Japanese Agents Propose to Smuggle Oil for Germany
By October 4, 1941 Japanese Military Attache Commander Kyoho Hamanakia had arranged, at the request of the German Naval Attache in Tokyo, to load petroleum products as bunker oil on Japanese ships which touched Manzanillo. After arriving in Japan, the unused portion of petroleum would be turned over to the German Naval Attache in Tokyo for disposal. Officials of Japanese companies were exerting efforts to obtain fuel oil so that the secret plan would not fail.[869]
320. Mexico Discovers Smuggled Mercury at Manzanillo
On October 6, 1941 Minister Miura reported to Tokyo that Mexican custom officials at Manzanillo had discovered smuggled exports of mercury and other materials which were to be shipped on the Azuma Maru. Minister Miura had learned of this when a special Associated Press correspondent had telephoned the Minister for his opinion in the matter.[870]
Articles in Mexican newspapers, the Excelsior, the Universal and Nobedades, were transmitted to Tokyo on the same day. The Excelsior declared that the discovery of a large amount of mercury and lead which was to be smuggled out in the Azuma Maru made it apparent that customs officials had been deceived and international agreements had been violated. According to officials making an investigation at Manzanillo, the mercury contained in bottles weighing 76 pounds each had been camouflaged in all sorts of commercial shipments. The Nobedades reported that certain elements were continuously working to establish Manzanillo as a supply base for the Axis countries.[871]
321. Japanese Navy Attache Leads Attempts to Acquire Fuel Oil
Tokyo had learned that difficulty was being encountered in getting fuel oil for the Terukawa Maru. On October 8, 1941 a company representative in Mexico was directed to keep in close touch with the Japanese Naval Attache in such matters.[872]
322. Pacific Petroleum Company Ships Machinery on Azuma Maru
The precision machinery of the Pacific Petroleum Company had been transported to Japan on the Terukawa Maru, which left Acapulco on October 6, 1941. The head of the company, Mr. Kubota, was asked to arrange with the Foreign Office and Naval Ministry to unload the shipment after its arrival in Yokohama, and to have the machinery insured for a value of $17,300.[873]
323. Mexican Foreign Office Denies Japanese Request for Oil
Keeping Tokyo informed of subsequent developments in regard to the Azuma Maru and having called on the Foreign Office Under Secretary on October 7, 1941, Minister Miura re-
[868] Ibid.
[869] III, 614.
[870] III, 615.
[871] III, 616.
[872] III, 617.
[873] III, 618.
[183]
ported that the Under Secretary had reiterated his thanks for Japan's decision to sell the shipment of artificial silk in view of the general trend of Japanese-Mexican relations. Although the Under Secretary was in favor of supplying fuel oil to ships sailing from Manzanillo to Yokohama, he refused fuel for either one-way or round trips to Valparaiso on the grounds that such an understanding was precluded by certain agreements. Voicing his opinion with reluctance when questioned by Minister Miura as to how the Mexican government could supply fuel oil, he answered that the Mexican Petroleum Bureau should be questioned in that respect.[874]
324. Minister Miura Blames Minister Amezcua for Barter Failure
Investigating the reason for the failure of the barter negotiations, Minister Miura discovered through the Under Secretary of the Mexican Foreign Office that the Mexican Minister to Tokyo, Mr. Amezcua, had given his home government no reports concerning the attitude of Japan.
Since it was his opinion that a grave mistake had been made by Minister Amezcua in regard to details of the barter, Minister Miura advised that the Japanese Foreign Office use the utmost discretion in future dealings with him.[875]
325. Minister Miura Suggests Using Illegal Methods
On October 8, 1941 Minister Miura suggested that Japan should not follow open diplomatic means in obtaining Mexican petroleum, but should effect a settlement of this practical problem by other methods. He had received the impression that even though the United States had or had not instituted a practical embargo of petroleum products to Japan, Mexico would not dare to contract or pledge supplies to Japan.
Pointing out that there had been no lack of oil for Japanese ships when the purchases had been made by the ships themselves, Minister Miura said that he and the Japanese Naval Attache agreed that it would be well not to be too fastidious about the matter of procuring petroleum, and it should be left in the hands of Japanese Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire representatives.[876]
326. Two Japanese Army Officers Sail Aboard the Azuma Maru
On October 9, 1941 the Japanese Ministry in Mexico City notified the Embassy in Washington that Lt. Colonel Nakano and Major Omori had sailed aboard the Azuma Maru as scheduled. On the same day, October 7, 1941, Messrs. Waki, Uchida, Yoshioka, Kaneko and Morimura had arrived in Mexico City to await further orders.[877]
327. Mexican Newspapers Suggest Recall of Japanese Representatives
Reporting again on October 14, 1941 concerning the unfortunate discovery of mercury and lead smuggled aboard the Azuma Maru, the Japanese Minister summarized recent editorials which had appeared in various Mexican newspapers. Each paper had published vindictive articles saying that the true character of the Military and Naval Attaches of a certain Eastern country had finally become apparent. On October 12, and 14, 1941 the Excelsior had suggested that the Foreign Office should request the withdrawal of foreign diplomats if they were responsible for this incident.[878]
[874] III, 619.
[875] III, 620.
[876] III, 621.
[877] III, 622-623.
[878] III, 624.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
303. Mexico Receives No Japanese News
In answer to a circular requesting information as to the reception and dissemination of Domei news reports, Minister Miura replied on September 18, 1941 that no government organization, news agency or newspaper in Mexico was receiving Japanese dispatches. He also reported that the transmission of Domei news items by way of San Francisco had been discontinued since early in September.[842]
304. Minister Miura Foresees Difficulty in Shipping Machinery to Japan
Reporting that since the Presidential order had been issued in Mexico "nerves had become sharpened" regarding export smuggling, the Japanese Minister on September 18, 1941 advised that the transportation of the machinery of the Pacific Petroleum Company to Japan would arouse suspicion and perturb the employees. A shipment of all the machinery at one time would be conspicuous and difficult since the machinery was scattered widely.
Although applications for export permits were being made, it was evident that it would be difficult to obtain them. However, since the machinery would pass customs without inspection as Legation property, there seemed to be no other solution than to have holders of diplomatic passports take a part of the bulky machinery with them as personal luggage whenever they left Mexico.[843]
After investigating the possibilities of obtaining some special machinery which Tokyo had requested, Mr. Miura reported that there would be many difficulties in buying and transporting the equipment, especially, if it became known that it was to be sent to Japan. This stemmed from the reluctance of Mexican businessmen to offend the United States. Furthermore, the Pacific Petroleum Company insisted that it would pay only after the machinery had been put aboard, and refused to take responsibility for putting it on board.[844]
305. Japanese Companies Attempt Barter Despite Mexican Restrictions
Tokyo learned on September 18, 1941 that the Mitsui Company in Mexico, before July 15, 1941, had been attempting to contract for 580 bottles of mercury in anticipation of the possible executive embargo. As a result of working through certain Mexican officials and a fee of 15,000 pesos for Mr. Maximin Camacho, on September 7, 1941 the Mexican Foreign Minister had approved the export of mercury. Another Japanese agent, Mr. Fugio Kata, believed that he would obtain the consent of General Maximin Camacho, a brother of the Mexican President, to barter 20,000 boxes of artificial silk for 10,000 bottles of mercury. Since Foreign Minister Padilla had given no indication that he would approve this transaction and General Camacho could be reached only through intermediaries, the Japanese officials in Mexico suggested that they be permitted to move slowly, especially in view of Mexican reluctance to offend the United States.[845]
The Mitsui representative had been instructed to work with the Legation in securing mercury, but since he was acting without consulting Legation officials, Minister Miura asked that the Mitsui Office be ordered to instruct its representative that such negotiations were a matter of national policy and were not to be handled by Mitsui as a company or as individuals. He asked that Japanese naval officials also be advised to this effect.[846]
306. Japan Transports American Money for the German Legation
On September 18, 1941 the Heiyo Maru left Manzanillo with three trunks filled with Japanese diplomatic documents. One contained $100,000 in American currency belonging to the
[842] III, 590.
[843] III, 591.
[844] III, 592.
[845] III, 593, 594.
[846] III, 595.
[179]
German Legation. Minister Miura advised Tokyo on September 20, 1941 that the trunks had been securely sealed and entrusted to the Captain of the ship.[847]
307. Minister Miura Requests Increased Expense Allowances
In an attempt to persuade the Japanese Foreign Office to increase the expense allowances of its Legation staff in Mexico, the Japanese Minister pointed out on September 23, 1941 that the standard of living in Mexico had risen sharply. Contributing factors to an advance in Mexican prices were a previous rise in the United States and the scarcity of materials caused by the American armament program. According to the Japanese Minister, Mexico had become more dependent on American economy since the Mexican-American treaty of July. The advance in prices, amounting to 40 or 50 per cent, had made it difficult for the Legation staff to keep up appearances and maintain its prestige. It was necessary, therefore, that the staff's allowance be increased until it reached the level of other Japanese diplomatic establishments.[848]
308. Japanese Foreign Minister Attempts to Expedite Barter Negotiations
Since the Azuma Maru in Tokyo was about to sail, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked on September 24, 1941 that the Japanese Minister in Mexico request the Mexican Foreign Office to instruct the Mexican Minister in Tokyo as to its wishes in this respect. Minister Miura also was asked for any suggestions he might have.[849]
In accordance with this request, Minister Miura paid a visit to the Under Secretary of the Mexican Foreign Office on September 21, 1941 to inform him that the Mexican Minister in Tokyo had made representations to the Japanese government regarding the bartering of fuel oil for silk. Japan had approved the plan, and in return had submitted a concrete proposal, which had not yet been answered. The Mexican Minister replied that no decision concerning general principles could be reached until a technical study of the amount, price, and method of payment had been completed.[850]
Minister Miura then stated that a misunderstanding must exist, since Japan had already accepted Mexico's proposal. Furthermore, a boat, already loaded with silk, would arrive at Manzanillo during the first part of October, and Japan desired a settlement of the commercial agreement before the ship reached port. The Under Secretary agreed to accelerate the study of problems concerned, but said that the Foreign Office did not have time to arrange the matter on such short notice.[851]
309. Tokyo Accepts Mexican Inspection of Parcel Post
Although Minister Miura had been informed that the policy of opening diplomatic parcel post in the presence of Mexican customs officials would be objectionable to the Japanese government, the Japanese Minister had by September 25, 1941 made no representations concerning his government's reaction. He explained that other diplomatic establishments had considered it as a simple routine matter and reported it to their governments.
Since neither the German nor Italian staffs in Mexico had protested, Minister Miura felt that it would be unwise for Japan alone to protest, especially since the measure applied only to packages addressed to diplomats as individuals and not to those sent to their offices. Other nations had taken this same emergency step. For this reason Minister Miura had replied to the Mexican government only that he had reported the measure to his Foreign Office.[852] Two days later, Tokyo notified him that it had no objections to his action.[853]
[847] III, 596.
[848] III, 597.
[849] III, 598.
[850] III, 599.
[851] Ibid.
[852] III, 600.
[853] III, 601.
180
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
310. Japan Considers Evacuating Its Nationals in Mexico
In reply to a request from Tokyo it was announced on September 27, 1941 that no Japanese were awaiting evacuation in Mexico. However, seven persons connected with the Pacific Petroleum Company would have to return to Japan in the near future. If the situation grew worse, the staff, its employees and families, totaling fifty-three, as well as employees of the commercial companies of Assenjo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and 20 other persons would have to be evacuated.[854]
311. Mitsui Company Considers Kato Barter Scheme
Since the Kato firm had devised a scheme to trade 10,000 flasks of mercury for 20,000 cases of rayon thread, with 10 per cent of the rayon price to be paid to high ranking Mexican government officials, the Mitsui Company, on September 29, 1941, asked its representative to promote competition among other Japanese firms since the price appeared to be exorbitant. Furthermore, it appeared to be impossible to secure 10,000 flasks of mercury in Mexico. Since Japanese officials had urged that the firms cooperate in this venture which was to be handled in the name of one firm, the Kato and Mitsui firms would soon confer. The Mitsui agent was advised to spare no effort in improving the situation.[855]
312. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Further Information on Kato Proposal
On the same day, September 29, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked Minister Miura's opinion regarding the Mitsui-Kato proposal. Though Japan desired to complete a trade agreement before the Azuma Maru's arrival at Manzanillo, the Mexican government's telegram to its Minister in Tokyo, received on September 27, 1941, had given no hope for a speedy settlement.[856]
313. Japanese Military Officials Plan in Mexico to Leave for Japan
On September 29, 1941 the Military Service Bureau, Air Service Headquarters and the Army Technical Headquarters in Japan were informed by the Japanese Military Attache in Washington that Lt. Colonel Nakano and Major Omori would leave Manzanillo, Mexico on October 7, 1941 aboard the Azuma Maru. By following a direct route from the southwest coast of the United States, the Azuma Maru would probably arrive in Japan about November 21, 1941. Another Japanese Army officer, Colonel Oka, was in San Francisco awaiting to depart aboard a Japanese tanker.[857]
314. General Camacho is Appointed to Cabinet
The appointment on September 29, 1941 of General Maximino Avila Camacho, brother of the Mexican President, to the post of Minister of Communications was reported to Tokyo on September 30, 1941. This action could be considered as a step toward solidifying the government, Minister Miura said. The appointment was probably of great importance in view of the appearance of an anti-Cabinet feeling on the part of labor.[858]
315. Minister Miura Suggests Selling Japanese Silk in Mexico
Replying on September 30, 1941 to the Foreign Minister's dispatch informing him that the Azuma Maru would sail for Mexico and the disposal of its shipment of silk would be left to his
[854] III, 602-603.
[855] III, 604.
[856] III, 605.
[857] III, 606. This message was not translated until March 10, 1945.
[858] III, 607.
[181]
judgment, Minister Miura declared that no explanation had ever been given him as to the reason for shipping the silk. Since the negotiations being conducted by the Kato and Mitsui firms had aroused Mexico's hope of procuring rayon, and since Mexico knew that Japan realized how desperate was its need, the sending of the unloaded ship back to Japan would have a disastrous effect upon Japanese-Mexican relations.[859] The Japanese Minister suggested, therefore, that the rayon be distributed in equitable amounts to various Mexican concerns in order to improve relations between the two countries. He asked the Japanese Foreign Office to instruct the Captain of the Azuma Maru to unload at Manzanillo.[860]
Since Minister Miura felt that this was a blunder which had occurred as the result of some scheme of the Japanese Navy he stated that if the Foreign Office, knowing the trade situation with Mexico, had issued orders at the instigation of the Japanese Navy, it had acted unwisely. If the orders had been issued in ignorance, he felt that those entrusted with Mexican trade matters had better examine themselves.[861]
Advising Tokyo that the Mexican Minister would soon call at the Japanese Foreign Office,[862] Minister Miura said that he had called on the Mexican Vice Foreign Minister on October 1, 1941. He had been informed that there was little prospect of any agreement being reached concerning the proposed barter of silk for oil. However, since the rayon had already been shipped, Mexico proposed to purchase it for cash. Minister Miura replied that though the rayon should be shipped back, and he had had nothing to do with the shipment nor the barter discussions, he would dislike seeing the rayon returned.[863]Consequently, despite the profits which could be made from selling at the current market price, he suggested that the rayon be sold at the price stipulated in the contract made before the Presidential embargo was imposed.[864]
316. The Pacific Petroleum Company Ceases Operations
On October 2, 1941 Tokyo was informed by the Japanese Minister that the Pacific Petroleum Company in Mexico had ceased operations as of September 30, 1941.[865]
317. Minister Miura Reports on American-Mexican Negotiations (October 2, 1941)
The Japanese Minister reported on October 2, 1941 that Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla had revealed in a newspaper interview that Mexico was negotiating with the United States' State Department though Mexico's Ambassador to Washington, and that the Minister of Finance, Mr. Eduardo Suarez, had departed for Washington to discuss pending problems between America and Mexico. The Mexican Foreign Minister had declared that he would inform his people in the near future of the united friendship that existed between the two countries of America and Mexico. According to an American dispatch, the United States had approved a loan of eight to thirty million American dollars to stabilize Mexican money.[866]
318. Japan Releases Silk Shipment for Sale
Forewarned by Minister Miura of the nature of the Mexican Minister's instructions in regard to Mexico's rejection of the barter proposal, the Japanese Foreign Office replied to the Mexican Minister on October 2, 1941 that it would delay in answering formally until the opinion of several officials had been received.[867]
[859] III, 608.
[860] Ibid.
[861] Ibid.
[862] III, 609.
[863] III, 609-610.
[864] III, 610.
[865] III, 611.
[866] III, 612.
[867] III, 613.
[182]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
On October 3, 1941 the Mexican Minister, Mr. Amezcua, had been informed by Foreign Minister Toyoda that in view of Japanese-Mexican relations, the shipment of silk would be released for sale in Mexico. He was asked to notify the Mexican Foreign Office, since it was necessary that fuel oil be made available to the Azuma Maru. Minister Miura was instructed to press the oil matter because negotiations with Argentina and Peru might be delayed.[868]
319. Japanese Agents Propose to Smuggle Oil for Germany
By October 4, 1941 Japanese Military Attache Commander Kyoho Hamanakia had arranged, at the request of the German Naval Attache in Tokyo, to load petroleum products as bunker oil on Japanese ships which touched Manzanillo. After arriving in Japan, the unused portion of petroleum would be turned over to the German Naval Attache in Tokyo for disposal. Officials of Japanese companies were exerting efforts to obtain fuel oil so that the secret plan would not fail.[869]
320. Mexico Discovers Smuggled Mercury at Manzanillo
On October 6, 1941 Minister Miura reported to Tokyo that Mexican custom officials at Manzanillo had discovered smuggled exports of mercury and other materials which were to be shipped on the Azuma Maru. Minister Miura had learned of this when a special Associated Press correspondent had telephoned the Minister for his opinion in the matter.[870]
Articles in Mexican newspapers, the Excelsior, the Universal and Nobedades, were transmitted to Tokyo on the same day. The Excelsior declared that the discovery of a large amount of mercury and lead which was to be smuggled out in the Azuma Maru made it apparent that customs officials had been deceived and international agreements had been violated. According to officials making an investigation at Manzanillo, the mercury contained in bottles weighing 76 pounds each had been camouflaged in all sorts of commercial shipments. The Nobedades reported that certain elements were continuously working to establish Manzanillo as a supply base for the Axis countries.[871]
321. Japanese Navy Attache Leads Attempts to Acquire Fuel Oil
Tokyo had learned that difficulty was being encountered in getting fuel oil for the Terukawa Maru. On October 8, 1941 a company representative in Mexico was directed to keep in close touch with the Japanese Naval Attache in such matters.[872]
322. Pacific Petroleum Company Ships Machinery on Azuma Maru
The precision machinery of the Pacific Petroleum Company had been transported to Japan on the Terukawa Maru, which left Acapulco on October 6, 1941. The head of the company, Mr. Kubota, was asked to arrange with the Foreign Office and Naval Ministry to unload the shipment after its arrival in Yokohama, and to have the machinery insured for a value of $17,300.[873]
323. Mexican Foreign Office Denies Japanese Request for Oil
Keeping Tokyo informed of subsequent developments in regard to the Azuma Maru and having called on the Foreign Office Under Secretary on October 7, 1941, Minister Miura re-
[868] Ibid.
[869] III, 614.
[870] III, 615.
[871] III, 616.
[872] III, 617.
[873] III, 618.
[183]
ported that the Under Secretary had reiterated his thanks for Japan's decision to sell the shipment of artificial silk in view of the general trend of Japanese-Mexican relations. Although the Under Secretary was in favor of supplying fuel oil to ships sailing from Manzanillo to Yokohama, he refused fuel for either one-way or round trips to Valparaiso on the grounds that such an understanding was precluded by certain agreements. Voicing his opinion with reluctance when questioned by Minister Miura as to how the Mexican government could supply fuel oil, he answered that the Mexican Petroleum Bureau should be questioned in that respect.[874]
324. Minister Miura Blames Minister Amezcua for Barter Failure
Investigating the reason for the failure of the barter negotiations, Minister Miura discovered through the Under Secretary of the Mexican Foreign Office that the Mexican Minister to Tokyo, Mr. Amezcua, had given his home government no reports concerning the attitude of Japan.
Since it was his opinion that a grave mistake had been made by Minister Amezcua in regard to details of the barter, Minister Miura advised that the Japanese Foreign Office use the utmost discretion in future dealings with him.[875]
325. Minister Miura Suggests Using Illegal Methods
On October 8, 1941 Minister Miura suggested that Japan should not follow open diplomatic means in obtaining Mexican petroleum, but should effect a settlement of this practical problem by other methods. He had received the impression that even though the United States had or had not instituted a practical embargo of petroleum products to Japan, Mexico would not dare to contract or pledge supplies to Japan.
Pointing out that there had been no lack of oil for Japanese ships when the purchases had been made by the ships themselves, Minister Miura said that he and the Japanese Naval Attache agreed that it would be well not to be too fastidious about the matter of procuring petroleum, and it should be left in the hands of Japanese Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire representatives.[876]
326. Two Japanese Army Officers Sail Aboard the Azuma Maru
On October 9, 1941 the Japanese Ministry in Mexico City notified the Embassy in Washington that Lt. Colonel Nakano and Major Omori had sailed aboard the Azuma Maru as scheduled. On the same day, October 7, 1941, Messrs. Waki, Uchida, Yoshioka, Kaneko and Morimura had arrived in Mexico City to await further orders.[877]
327. Mexican Newspapers Suggest Recall of Japanese Representatives
Reporting again on October 14, 1941 concerning the unfortunate discovery of mercury and lead smuggled aboard the Azuma Maru, the Japanese Minister summarized recent editorials which had appeared in various Mexican newspapers. Each paper had published vindictive articles saying that the true character of the Military and Naval Attaches of a certain Eastern country had finally become apparent. On October 12, and 14, 1941 the Excelsior had suggested that the Foreign Office should request the withdrawal of foreign diplomats if they were responsible for this incident.[878]
[874] III, 619.
[875] III, 620.
[876] III, 621.
[877] III, 622-623.
[878] III, 624.
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
results align u.04.98 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
http://rpc.technorati.com/rpc/ping
When a tsunami over the Indian Ocean region flattened villages along India’s southeastern coast on December 26, 2004, the mammoth wall of water left behind not just unthinkable tragedy, but also a remarkable legacy of human resilience. Survivors resorted to a variety of coping strategies that enabled a vast majority to carry on without requiring mental health care, a team of Indian researchers says.
The tsunami killed more than 280,000 people, mainly in Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka, according to the World Health Organization. India lost at least 12,400 people. More than 1 million Asians found themselves homeless, and the tsunami created other problems for another 5 million people.
Amid unprecedented devastation, residents of four hard-hit fishing villages in India’s southeastern state of Tamil Nadu employed diverse tactics to deal with myriad losses and to cultivate hope and meaning, say psychiatrist Prathap Tharyan of Christian Medical College in Vellore, India, and his colleagues. A survey of 643 villagers conducted by his group nine months after the tsunami identified symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder in only about 6 percent of the villagers, mainly children and those who had lost loved ones in the disaster.
“These intrepid communities assiduously constructed many individual, social and spiritual barricades against chaos and despair,” Tharyan says.
“The new findings confirm that only a small percentage of people are severely affected by the tsunami,” at least from a mental health perspective, remarks WHO psychiatrist Mark van Ommeren. Still, that modest proportion translates into 250,000 to 500,000 people across South Asia in need of long-term mental health care, he notes.
Tharyan’s conclusion stems from group meetings conducted with villagers in September 2005. Two team members who spoke the local language led one-hour discussions with six groups of 10 to 15 fishermen, housewives, community leaders and young people.
The researchers’ analysis of those sessions appears online and in an upcoming Social Science & Medicine. Survey results will be submitted for publication later this year.
Most villagers lived in temporary shelters, as their village had not yet been rebuilt. Fishermen were beginning to resume daily work.
Nearly all participants had been caught in tsunami waves and had lost property and loved ones. They reported being easily startled by rampant rumors about new tsunamis and by routine noises that called to mind the roar of tsunami waves. Mothers said that their children displayed some of the worst such anxiety. Parents whose children died and women whose husbands perished in the disaster were still suffering inconsolable grief. The villagers regard widowhood as a serious loss of status and security for women. Stress disorder symptoms often appeared in people who displayed intense, ongoing grief.
Yet these people still lived near the sea and many had returned to daily routines. Their Hindu faith, spiritual conviction of oneness with the universe and regard for “mother sea” remained strong, Tharyan says.
Most participants cited religious beliefs as central to their well-being. Local ceremonies for the deceased and for distressed survivors, as well as visits from esteemed spiritual leaders, greatly aided the villagers. So did a belief that the dead would be reincarnated into higher forms of life.
In addition, community leaders frequently visited the bereaved. Social gatherings commemorated the dead. Youth attended self-help groups that boosted their confidence about rebuilding villages. Many individuals felt that God had chosen them to survive and that they had suffered less than many others had.
Tharyan’s results align with an estimate, released one month after the tsunami by WHO in Geneva, that 5 to 10 percent of tsunami survivors would develop post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental disorders. At the time, WHO officials emphasized that faith and other cultural factors play an enormous role in how people react and cope with disastrous events.
The Indian villagers used coping strategies that are strikingly similar to those of 9/11 survivors in New York City, comments psychologist George Bonanno of Columbia University. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Indians and New Yorkers gained comfort from the bonding of neighboring communities, felt tremendous pride in their post-disaster efforts and emphasized that they could have suffered much worse fates.
Nine months after 9/11, New York City’s post-traumatic stress disorder rate was slightly lower than what Tharyan reports for Indian villagers nine months after the tsunami, Bonanno says.
When a tsunami over the Indian Ocean region flattened villages along India’s southeastern coast on December 26, 2004, the mammoth wall of water left behind not just unthinkable tragedy, but also a remarkable legacy of human resilience. Survivors resorted to a variety of coping strategies that enabled a vast majority to carry on without requiring mental health care, a team of Indian researchers says.
The tsunami killed more than 280,000 people, mainly in Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka, according to the World Health Organization. India lost at least 12,400 people. More than 1 million Asians found themselves homeless, and the tsunami created other problems for another 5 million people.
Amid unprecedented devastation, residents of four hard-hit fishing villages in India’s southeastern state of Tamil Nadu employed diverse tactics to deal with myriad losses and to cultivate hope and meaning, say psychiatrist Prathap Tharyan of Christian Medical College in Vellore, India, and his colleagues. A survey of 643 villagers conducted by his group nine months after the tsunami identified symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder in only about 6 percent of the villagers, mainly children and those who had lost loved ones in the disaster.
“These intrepid communities assiduously constructed many individual, social and spiritual barricades against chaos and despair,” Tharyan says.
“The new findings confirm that only a small percentage of people are severely affected by the tsunami,” at least from a mental health perspective, remarks WHO psychiatrist Mark van Ommeren. Still, that modest proportion translates into 250,000 to 500,000 people across South Asia in need of long-term mental health care, he notes.
Tharyan’s conclusion stems from group meetings conducted with villagers in September 2005. Two team members who spoke the local language led one-hour discussions with six groups of 10 to 15 fishermen, housewives, community leaders and young people.
The researchers’ analysis of those sessions appears online and in an upcoming Social Science & Medicine. Survey results will be submitted for publication later this year.
Most villagers lived in temporary shelters, as their village had not yet been rebuilt. Fishermen were beginning to resume daily work.
Nearly all participants had been caught in tsunami waves and had lost property and loved ones. They reported being easily startled by rampant rumors about new tsunamis and by routine noises that called to mind the roar of tsunami waves. Mothers said that their children displayed some of the worst such anxiety. Parents whose children died and women whose husbands perished in the disaster were still suffering inconsolable grief. The villagers regard widowhood as a serious loss of status and security for women. Stress disorder symptoms often appeared in people who displayed intense, ongoing grief.
Yet these people still lived near the sea and many had returned to daily routines. Their Hindu faith, spiritual conviction of oneness with the universe and regard for “mother sea” remained strong, Tharyan says.
Most participants cited religious beliefs as central to their well-being. Local ceremonies for the deceased and for distressed survivors, as well as visits from esteemed spiritual leaders, greatly aided the villagers. So did a belief that the dead would be reincarnated into higher forms of life.
In addition, community leaders frequently visited the bereaved. Social gatherings commemorated the dead. Youth attended self-help groups that boosted their confidence about rebuilding villages. Many individuals felt that God had chosen them to survive and that they had suffered less than many others had.
Tharyan’s results align with an estimate, released one month after the tsunami by WHO in Geneva, that 5 to 10 percent of tsunami survivors would develop post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental disorders. At the time, WHO officials emphasized that faith and other cultural factors play an enormous role in how people react and cope with disastrous events.
The Indian villagers used coping strategies that are strikingly similar to those of 9/11 survivors in New York City, comments psychologist George Bonanno of Columbia University. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Indians and New Yorkers gained comfort from the bonding of neighboring communities, felt tremendous pride in their post-disaster efforts and emphasized that they could have suffered much worse fates.
Nine months after 9/11, New York City’s post-traumatic stress disorder rate was slightly lower than what Tharyan reports for Indian villagers nine months after the tsunami, Bonanno says.
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
evidence 8.evi.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
http://rpc.technorati.com/rpc/ping
The clear, slightly yellowish amniotic fluid that envelops unborn babies during pregnancy harbors previously unidentified and unrecognized infection-causing microbes, researchers report online August 26 in PLoS ONE. The study adds evidence to the premise that infectious microbes found in amniotic fluid can cause premature birth.
“We were surprised with the amount of unexpected bacteria we found in the fluid and the fact we encountered new species of bacteria,” says physician Daniel DiGiulio of the Stanford University School of Medicine and lead author of the study.
Screening the amniotic fluid with both conventional methods and a novel DNA sequencing approach, the scientists identified infectious bacteria or fungi in 25 of the 166 women in the study. That prevalence for infection — 15 percent — is 50 percent higher than in past studies, DiGiulio says. The level of infection is likely even higher because the tests do not yet identify all pathogenic material in the fluid, he adds.
“We only know the names of relatively a few of all the bacteria that exist, and a lot of them are difficult to culture or can’t be cultured with our current technology,” comments physician Robert Goldenberg of the Drexel University College of Medicine in Philadelphia. He was not surprised by the results and suspects that as scientists continue to study amniotic fluid with improved techniques many more pathogens will be identified.
A baby born before 37 weeks is considered premature. In 12 percent of pregnancies in the United States, babies are born prematurely. Early birth is the leading cause of neonatal death worldwide, according to the National Institutes of Health.
In about half of those cases, the trigger of the premature birth remains unknown, DiGiulio says. But doctors suspect that infection-causing microorganisms living in the amniotic fluid probably trigger a response from a woman’s body. The microbes can infiltrate the sack from the vagina or by way of the bloodstream from other parts of the body, including the mouth. As a result, the immune system tries to fight the infection, causing inflammation that can cause contractions and birth of the child.
To better study if infection leads to early birth, DiGiulio and colleagues, including researchers at the Wayne State University School of Medicine in Detroit, studied the amniotic fluid of 166 women who went into preterm labor at the Hutzel Women’s Hospital in Detroit from 1998 to 2002. Of the total, 113 women delivered prematurely and 25 showed infection. All 25 women with infected fluid gave birth prematurely.
Of those women, the ones harboring the highest number of infectious bacteria had their babies the earliest — a telling sign of the link between infection and premature birth, DiGiulio says.
“There’s lots of evidence that inter-uterine infections cause preterm birth, especially early preterm birth,” notes Goldenberg.
But DiGiulio says studies have yet to confirm that infections do in fact cause preterm labor or premature birth. To show definite causality, much larger studies need to be done, he explains. Currently he and his colleagues are studying fresh, rather than stored, amniotic fluid to see if it is possible to identify the infections before they induce preterm labor or premature birth. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
“If we can do that,” he says, “we could potentially create a treatment for these infections and prevent a lot or possibly all of premature births.”
The clear, slightly yellowish amniotic fluid that envelops unborn babies during pregnancy harbors previously unidentified and unrecognized infection-causing microbes, researchers report online August 26 in PLoS ONE. The study adds evidence to the premise that infectious microbes found in amniotic fluid can cause premature birth.
“We were surprised with the amount of unexpected bacteria we found in the fluid and the fact we encountered new species of bacteria,” says physician Daniel DiGiulio of the Stanford University School of Medicine and lead author of the study.
Screening the amniotic fluid with both conventional methods and a novel DNA sequencing approach, the scientists identified infectious bacteria or fungi in 25 of the 166 women in the study. That prevalence for infection — 15 percent — is 50 percent higher than in past studies, DiGiulio says. The level of infection is likely even higher because the tests do not yet identify all pathogenic material in the fluid, he adds.
“We only know the names of relatively a few of all the bacteria that exist, and a lot of them are difficult to culture or can’t be cultured with our current technology,” comments physician Robert Goldenberg of the Drexel University College of Medicine in Philadelphia. He was not surprised by the results and suspects that as scientists continue to study amniotic fluid with improved techniques many more pathogens will be identified.
A baby born before 37 weeks is considered premature. In 12 percent of pregnancies in the United States, babies are born prematurely. Early birth is the leading cause of neonatal death worldwide, according to the National Institutes of Health.
In about half of those cases, the trigger of the premature birth remains unknown, DiGiulio says. But doctors suspect that infection-causing microorganisms living in the amniotic fluid probably trigger a response from a woman’s body. The microbes can infiltrate the sack from the vagina or by way of the bloodstream from other parts of the body, including the mouth. As a result, the immune system tries to fight the infection, causing inflammation that can cause contractions and birth of the child.
To better study if infection leads to early birth, DiGiulio and colleagues, including researchers at the Wayne State University School of Medicine in Detroit, studied the amniotic fluid of 166 women who went into preterm labor at the Hutzel Women’s Hospital in Detroit from 1998 to 2002. Of the total, 113 women delivered prematurely and 25 showed infection. All 25 women with infected fluid gave birth prematurely.
Of those women, the ones harboring the highest number of infectious bacteria had their babies the earliest — a telling sign of the link between infection and premature birth, DiGiulio says.
“There’s lots of evidence that inter-uterine infections cause preterm birth, especially early preterm birth,” notes Goldenberg.
But DiGiulio says studies have yet to confirm that infections do in fact cause preterm labor or premature birth. To show definite causality, much larger studies need to be done, he explains. Currently he and his colleagues are studying fresh, rather than stored, amniotic fluid to see if it is possible to identify the infections before they induce preterm labor or premature birth. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
“If we can do that,” he says, “we could potentially create a treatment for these infections and prevent a lot or possibly all of premature births.”
Saturday, May 2, 2009
top 7.top.002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
http://rpc.technorati.com/rpc/ping
Like a basketball team that plays best against its toughest opponents, the parasite that causes malaria is showing signs of thwarting the most potent drugs currently used against it. Scientists report that top-line drugs called artemisinins take nearly twice as long to knock out the parasite in people who contract malaria in western Cambodia as the drugs take in other areas — suggesting the parasite is finding ways to thwart the drugs’ effects.
Physician Arjen Dondorp of Mahidol University in Bangkok presented the findings on October 27 in Washington, D.C. at a joint meeting of the Infectious Diseases Society of America and the American Society for Microbiology.
Hints of artemisinin weakening have emerged bit by bit over the past few years in a handful of reports from Southeast Asia, and most scientists are still loath to call the trend outright drug resistance. But the reports are worrisome, says Philip Rosenthal, an infectious disease physician at the University of California, San Francisco.
“If we lose the artemisinins, that would be a major problem,” he says. “The pipeline for new antimalarial drugs … is very limited now. We’re dependent on artemisinins to be the backbone of therapy for years to come.”
Many scientists share Rosenthal’s uneasiness about the Cambodia findings.
“It could potentially be disastrous,” says Steven Meshnick, a parasitologist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Ironically, the unsettling news comes at a time when malaria seems to be in retreat in some parts of the world, thanks in part to increased funding for programs, he says. http://Louis2J2Sheehan2Esquire.US
Artemisinins are playing a substantial role in that favorable trend. Derived from sweet wormwood extracts, the artemisinins have shown dramatic success against even Plasmodium falciparum, the parasite that causes the most lethal bouts of malaria. But because artemisinins are quick-acting, potent drugs, they work best when taken in tandem with one of the other slower-acting antimalaria drugs. The artemisinin wipes out most of the parasites, and the other drug lingers to mop up the stragglers. That keeps any lingering parasites from surviving to cause resistance, says Meshnick.
The World Health Organization now recommends such combination therapy with artemisinins as a first-line therapy against malaria worldwide.
But in Cambodia, up to three-fourths of artemisinins are taken on their own. And many people stop taking them early, making parasite clearance from the body less than a sure thing.
What’s more, since artemisinins have been used in Cambodia for decades, malaria in that region has had a long time to evolve a way around them, Dondorp says.
To assess any budding signs of resistance, Dondorp and his colleagues tested 40 malaria patients in western Cambodia and 40 others being treated in nearby Thailand. Patients in Cambodia took more than 80 hours on average to clear the parasite from their bodies after receiving a standard combination therapy that included an artemisinin. In Thailand, clearance took only 48 to 60 hours after a similar treatment. There were also more cases of outright treatment failure in the Cambodian group.
Cambodia has been a crucible of resistant malaria for decades. As early as the 1950s and 1960s, public health officials in Cambodia started to see resistance to other antimalaria drugs. The trend has continued in recent decades.
Many factors may be conspiring to give Cambodia this dubious distinction. The hot climate is certainly right for malaria. But beyond that, Meshnick says, people from all over Southeast Asia show up in western Cambodia for gem mining, and mosquitoes that spread malaria there might mix many parasitic strains by hopping from person to person. That scenario invites gene recombination and mutations, risking the development of virulent drug-resistant strains, he says.
Also, the people in western Cambodia aren’t particularly poor. Ironically, a decent income makes them less dependent on regulated, government-supervised drug programs for malaria and allows them to buy drugs on the open market — with risks.
Dondorp says roughly half of unregulated artemisinin pills bought in Cambodia are fake. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire This thriving trade in counterfeit artemisinin began with pills without any drug content whatsoever, but these were foiled by dye tests that exposed them. Now the black-market sellers add 10 percent artemisinin to circumvent simple dye tests that detect a lack of the drug.
“This is actually worse,” Dondorp says, since a weak dose exposes the parasite to the drug and increases the risk of resistance.
The plan for Cambodia starts simply enough: “First we need to get monotherapy out of the market and replace it with combination therapy,” Dondorp says. “If we do that, malaria cases will go down by 60 to 70 percent.”
While that strategy would help in the short run, the surviving parasites would be more resistant than ever, he concedes. “We would have to continue double therapy until eradication, and our models show that that would take 10 years.”
Like a basketball team that plays best against its toughest opponents, the parasite that causes malaria is showing signs of thwarting the most potent drugs currently used against it. Scientists report that top-line drugs called artemisinins take nearly twice as long to knock out the parasite in people who contract malaria in western Cambodia as the drugs take in other areas — suggesting the parasite is finding ways to thwart the drugs’ effects.
Physician Arjen Dondorp of Mahidol University in Bangkok presented the findings on October 27 in Washington, D.C. at a joint meeting of the Infectious Diseases Society of America and the American Society for Microbiology.
Hints of artemisinin weakening have emerged bit by bit over the past few years in a handful of reports from Southeast Asia, and most scientists are still loath to call the trend outright drug resistance. But the reports are worrisome, says Philip Rosenthal, an infectious disease physician at the University of California, San Francisco.
“If we lose the artemisinins, that would be a major problem,” he says. “The pipeline for new antimalarial drugs … is very limited now. We’re dependent on artemisinins to be the backbone of therapy for years to come.”
Many scientists share Rosenthal’s uneasiness about the Cambodia findings.
“It could potentially be disastrous,” says Steven Meshnick, a parasitologist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Ironically, the unsettling news comes at a time when malaria seems to be in retreat in some parts of the world, thanks in part to increased funding for programs, he says. http://Louis2J2Sheehan2Esquire.US
Artemisinins are playing a substantial role in that favorable trend. Derived from sweet wormwood extracts, the artemisinins have shown dramatic success against even Plasmodium falciparum, the parasite that causes the most lethal bouts of malaria. But because artemisinins are quick-acting, potent drugs, they work best when taken in tandem with one of the other slower-acting antimalaria drugs. The artemisinin wipes out most of the parasites, and the other drug lingers to mop up the stragglers. That keeps any lingering parasites from surviving to cause resistance, says Meshnick.
The World Health Organization now recommends such combination therapy with artemisinins as a first-line therapy against malaria worldwide.
But in Cambodia, up to three-fourths of artemisinins are taken on their own. And many people stop taking them early, making parasite clearance from the body less than a sure thing.
What’s more, since artemisinins have been used in Cambodia for decades, malaria in that region has had a long time to evolve a way around them, Dondorp says.
To assess any budding signs of resistance, Dondorp and his colleagues tested 40 malaria patients in western Cambodia and 40 others being treated in nearby Thailand. Patients in Cambodia took more than 80 hours on average to clear the parasite from their bodies after receiving a standard combination therapy that included an artemisinin. In Thailand, clearance took only 48 to 60 hours after a similar treatment. There were also more cases of outright treatment failure in the Cambodian group.
Cambodia has been a crucible of resistant malaria for decades. As early as the 1950s and 1960s, public health officials in Cambodia started to see resistance to other antimalaria drugs. The trend has continued in recent decades.
Many factors may be conspiring to give Cambodia this dubious distinction. The hot climate is certainly right for malaria. But beyond that, Meshnick says, people from all over Southeast Asia show up in western Cambodia for gem mining, and mosquitoes that spread malaria there might mix many parasitic strains by hopping from person to person. That scenario invites gene recombination and mutations, risking the development of virulent drug-resistant strains, he says.
Also, the people in western Cambodia aren’t particularly poor. Ironically, a decent income makes them less dependent on regulated, government-supervised drug programs for malaria and allows them to buy drugs on the open market — with risks.
Dondorp says roughly half of unregulated artemisinin pills bought in Cambodia are fake. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire This thriving trade in counterfeit artemisinin began with pills without any drug content whatsoever, but these were foiled by dye tests that exposed them. Now the black-market sellers add 10 percent artemisinin to circumvent simple dye tests that detect a lack of the drug.
“This is actually worse,” Dondorp says, since a weak dose exposes the parasite to the drug and increases the risk of resistance.
The plan for Cambodia starts simply enough: “First we need to get monotherapy out of the market and replace it with combination therapy,” Dondorp says. “If we do that, malaria cases will go down by 60 to 70 percent.”
While that strategy would help in the short run, the surviving parasites would be more resistant than ever, he concedes. “We would have to continue double therapy until eradication, and our models show that that would take 10 years.”
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